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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Guy Coulston was charged with and ultimately convicted of lewd conduct of a
minor under sixteen. Prior to trial, Mr. Coulston filed a motion to suppress statements
made during an interrogation by Deputy Oyler where Mr. Coulston informed the officer
that he had "better talk to an attorney." Despite Mr. Coulston's unequivocal request, the
interrogating officer continued to question him. On appeal, Mr. Coulston contends that
the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements in violation of Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Guy Coulston is a single father to three female children. (Tr., p.782, Ls.18-23.)
The two youngest children are Mr. Coulston's biological daughters with his ex-wife
Millicent Coulston. (Tr., p.783, Ls.4-20.) The oldest child, A.M., is Millicent's child from
another relationship.

(Tr., p.782, L.18 - p.783, L.23.)

After a number of years of

marriage, Mr. Coulston on Millicent divorced and Millicent took the children. (Tr., p.783,
L.23 - p. 784, L.24.) After approximately two years, Mr. Coulston obtained custody of all
three girls when Millicent "really got into drugs and lost herself.
p.785, L.18.)

(Tr., p.784, L.21 -

Thereafter, Mr. Coulston raised the three girls as a single father.

(Tr., p.785, L.19-p.787, L.3.)
On November 29, 2011, Mr. Coulston received a call from his babysitter who
stated that his two youngest daughters did not get off the bus after school, so
Mr. Coulston was frantically looking for them. (Tr., p.807, L.25 - p.808, L.4, p.841,
Ls.18-25.)

Unbeknownst to Mr. Coulston, A.M. had met with the school counselor

because she was mad at Mr. Coulston after he told her she could not go to her
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afterschool activities. (Tr., p.313, Ls.1-7.) A.M. told the counselor and eventually law
enforcement that Mr. Coulston had been having sexual intercourse with her.
Tr., p.303, L.1 - 371, L.24.)

(See

Mr. Coulston then received a pretext call "from A.M."

(Tr., p.219, L.10 - p.220, L.12.) VVhile it was A.M.'s voice on the phone, Officer Oyler
was telling A.M. what to say to Mr. Coulston. (Tr., p.269, L.9 - p.273, L.1.) After the
call, Officer Oyler contacted Mr. Coulston and Mr. Coulston went to the police station to
meet with Oyler.

(Tr., p.222, L.9 - p.223, L.9.)

After approximately an hour of

questioning, Mr. Coulston was arrested. (See Exhibit B.)
Mr. Coulston was charged by Information with lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen.

(R., pp.74-75.)

Mr. Coulston filed a motion to suppress, arguing that all

statements made after he invoked his right to counsel must be suppressed of a violation
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. (R., pp.83-84.) The State
filed an opposing brief and the district court held a hearing. (R., pp.92-99.) The district
court held that Mr. Coulston's request for an attorney was "ambiguous" and denied his
Motion to Suppress. (Tr., p.29, L.10 - p.33, L.5; R., p.315.) Mr. Coulston proceeded to
trial and during the second day of deliberation, was found guilty of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen.

(R., pp.248-252, 286.)

The district court imposed a unified

sentence of thirty years, with fifteen years fixed, upon Mr. Coulston. (R., pp.298-300.)
Mr. Coulston filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of
conviction. (R., pp.306-308.)
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress statements made
during an interrogation where Mr. Coulston's unequivocally requested an attorney?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denyin Mr. Coulston's Motion To Suppress Statements
Made During An Interrogation Where Deputy Oyler Failed To Honor Mr. Cou!ston's
Unequivocal Request For An Attorney
A.

Introduction
After a little under 30 minutes of interrogation, Mr. Coulston paused, took a deep

breath and told the interrogating officer, "Ya know, guess from here on out, I know you
guys got your things and, better talk to an attorney.

I have no idea."

Despite

Mr. Coulston's unequivocal request for an attorney, Officer Oyler pressed further and
continued to question Mr. Coulston. Mr. Coulston filed a motion to suppress statements
made after his unequivocal invocation of counsel, which was denied by the district court.
The district court erred in denying Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress, and as a result,
his case should be remanded back for a new trial.

8.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's findings of fact which
were supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561,
(Ct. App. 1996).

Mr. Coulston does not take issue with the district court's factual

findings in this case, only its legal conclusion.

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Coulston's Motion To Suppress
Statements Made During An Interrogation Where Deputy Oyler Failed To Honor
Mr. Coulston's Unequivocal Request For An Attorney
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that a

defendant has a constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. U.S. CONST AMEND
4

V.

A defendant's Fifth Amendment rights must be explained to him before custodial

interrogation may begin.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

According to

Miranda:
when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to
questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.
Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege, and
unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his
right of silence and to assure the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior
to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he
says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney; and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will
be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

Id. at 464. Miranda safeguards must "come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v.

Innis, 466 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).

Interrogation is therefore defined as "any words or

actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect."

Id. at 301.

Once a defendant

unambiguously invokes his right to counsel request for counsel, it must be scrupulously
honored, and interrogation may not resume until an attorney is present or the suspect
himself reinitiates the conversation. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981 ); See

also Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994).

If the right to counsel has been

invoked, the police may not reinitiate interrogation of the detainee in the absence of an
attorney. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1990); State v. Tapp, 136 Idaho
354, 360 (Ct. App. 2001 ).

1.

Mr. Coulston Was In Custody For Purposes Of Miranda

The requirement of Miranda warnings is operative whenever a person is
interrogated while they are in "custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
5

any significant way." Miranda, 384 at 444 (emphasis added); State v. Doe, 130 idaho
811, 814, 948 P.2d 166, 169 (Ct. App. 1997).

If a person is not Mirandized before

answering a question in a custodial interrogation, the statement is inadmissible.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 492-94.
A person is in custody for purposes of the Miranda requirement ·...vhen there is a
formal arrest, or when there is a restraint on the freedom of a person's movement to
such a degree that is associated with a formal arrest, or that person's freedom of action
is significantiy deprived.

California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); State v.

Loosli, 130 Idaho 398, 399 (1997). In determining whether a person is in custody, the
relevant question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have
understood his situation. State v. Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591 (Ct. App. 1999). "The
totality of the circumstances must be examined, which may include the location of the
interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, the
time of the interrogation, and other persons present." Id. (citing State v. Medrano, 123
Idaho 114, 117-118 (Ct. App. 1992)).
In the instant case, the State conceded that Mr. Coulston was in custody by
failing to object to Mr. Coulston's custodial status. In addition, the district court implicitly
found that Mr. Coulston was in custody at the time at the time of his request for counsel
by deciding whether Mr. Coulston's request for counsel was unequivocal.

In fact,

Mr. Coulston, after driving himself to the station, was ushered into a room where his
chair was in the back corner away from the door.

(See Exhibit B.)

Officer Ohler

entered, took a chair in front of Mr. Coulston, and shut the door of the small room. (See
Exhibit B.) Mr. Coulston was informed that he was not "under arrest" but was then read
his Miranda rights.

(See Exhibit 8.)

Mr. Coulston was also given a copy of
6

documentation that his children had been sheltered. (See Exhibit B.) It is apparent, as
both the district court and prosecutor recognized that Mr. Coulston was in custody
during the questioning by Officer Oyler.

2.

Mr. Coulston Was ''Interrogated" For Purposes Of Miranda

1'11iranda safeguards must "come into play whenever a person in custody is
subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent." Rhode Island v.

Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980).

In Innis, the United States Supreme Court further

defined what it meant by the term "interrogation," stating:
[w]e conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a
person in custody is subjected to either express questioning, or its
functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "interrogation" under
Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or
actions on the part of the poiice (other than those normal attendant to
arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this
definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather
than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda
safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added
measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to
objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the
police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response
from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely
cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable result of their words or
actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions
on the part of police officers that he should have known were reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response.

Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-302 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Again, whether Mr. Coulston was subjected to express questioning was not
addressed by any party or the court below. As such, in order to reach the question of
whether a request was made, the district would have had to conclude that Mr. Coulston
was subjected to express questioning. This, of course, is consistent with any view of
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the interrogation in question where Officer Oyler was asking questions with the intent of
gaining an incriminating response. (See generally Exhibit 8.)

3.

Mr. Coulston Unequivocally Requested Counsel

In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court indicated that a police interrogation
must terminate when a person in custody indicates "in any manner" that he wishes to
consult with an attorney. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. In Davis, the Court required
more than a simple request, but an unequivocal request by the detainee. 512 U.S. at
459. The Davis Court explained the objective standard that applies in the detainee:
must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the
requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require that the officers stop
questioning the suspect. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 433 n. 4
(1986) ("[T]he interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only [i]f
the individual states that he wants an attorney").

Id.

With regard to ambiguous requests, Davis decision observes:
Of course, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it
will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify
whether or not he actually wants an attorney .... Clarifying questions help
protect the rights of the suspect by ensuring that he gets an attorney if he
wants one, and will minimize the chance of a confession being
suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the
meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel. But we decline to
adopt a rule requiring officers to ask clarifying questions. If the suspect's
statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the
officers have no obligation to stop questioning him.

Id. at 460. In reaching its decision, the Davis Court held that the defendant's statement
in that case, "Maybe I should talk to an attorney," was not an unequivocal request for
counsel that obligated the officers to stop the interrogation. Id.
After a little almost 28 minutes of questioning from Officer Oyler, the following
colloquy occurred:
8

Oyler:

... Sounds like [A.M.] plays the role of the wife and mother. And I
can understand wires can get crossed on that, ya know? She acts
older than her age, kinda like a pseudo-wife, so to speak. You
haven't been able to have a decent relationship because you've
sacrificed for these kids. And you're a man, you need some
release every now and then.

Coulston:

I've got my person for release.

Oyler:

Your person?

Coulston:

Yeah, (inaudible) I am a man I do need something.

Olyer:

So you got a friend for that?

Coulston:

Yeah, when the kids ain't around. Other than that my hand works
just fine.

Oyler:

Well, it would make sense, whether you intend it or not, that some
lines can be crossed with [A.M.]. She's a cute little thing.

Coulston:

Oh yeah, I keep her well under ...

Oyler:

I'd imagine she's got some boys chasin after her.
[Deep breath by Coulston]

Coulston:

Sad

Oyler:

So this is where we're at with it.

Coulston:

No, I'm not. No. Guess from here on out, cause I know you guys
got your things, better talk to an attorney. I have no idea.
[Ohler takes deep breath, leans forward and moves his chair closer
to Coulston]

Oyler:

Let me ask you this Guy, cause like I said you seem to be a straight
shooter. What are we going to do, right now [A.M.] is getting a
sexual assault exam and uh, we find your sperm inside her from
Sunday night.

Coulston:

[No response]

Oyler:

That is what it is. Proof positive and you know we are going to find
it.

(Exhibit Bat 26:50-30:00.)
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It is abundantly apparent, based on any view of the video of the interrogation in
this case that Mr. Coulston unequivocally requested an attorney and Officer Oyler flat
out ignored his request and pressed even harder for an incriminatory statement. The
moment Officer Oyler began accusing Mr. Coulston of inappropriate conduct with A.M.;
Mr. Coulston paused, took a deep breath and said "Sad." When Officer Oyler pressed
further, saying, "So this is where we're at with it," Mr. Coulston responded with, "No, I'm
not[,] [n]o." Mr. Coulston then stated, "Guess from here on out, cause I know you guys
got your things; better talk to an attorney."

There is nothing unequivocal about

Mr. Coulston's request, he stated, based upon the accusations ("I know you guys got
your things") he had "better talk to an attorney."

Any other conclusion ignores the

totality of the interrogation, Mr. Coulston's body language, and the circumstances at the
time he made his unequivocal request.
Further, it is apparent that Officer Oyler recognized the request for counsel as the
moment Mr. Coulston asked to talk to an attorney: Oyler paused, took a deep breath,
leaned forward, and scooted his chair closer to Mr. Coulston.

Rather than even

acknowledging Mr. Coulston's request for counsel, Oyler pressed even harder for an
incriminatory statement.

Officer Oyler moved from asking questions and insinuating

inappropriate conduct, to telling Mr. Coulston what they would find from A.M.'s sexual
assault examination.
It is also important to compare Oyler's demeanor and reaction the first time
Mr. Coulston invoked counsel when no incriminatory statements had yet been made,
with Oyler's response to Mr. Coulston's second invocation, after purported incriminatory
statements had been made. During Mr. Coulston's first invocation, Oyler ignored the
request and pressed harder for a confession of sorts. (Exhibit B at 28:00-30:00.) The
10

second time Mr. Coulston invoked his right to counsel, he stated: ''Do I still get to speak
to an attorney." (Exhibit Bat 59:55.) At this point in the interrogation, Oyler had already
gotten what he wanted out of his questioning and was in the process of obtaining DNA
samples from Mr. Coulston, Oyler replied, "Yeah, you can get an attorney anytime you
want to."

(Exhibit 8 at 59:59.)

Officer Oyler's responses to the Mr. Coulston's

invocations of counsel, based upon when they occurred in the interrogation, are
evidence of his intentional avoidance and ignorance of Mr. Coulston's Fifth Amendment
right to counsel.
Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the district court erred in denying
Mr. Coulston's motion to suppress statements obtained in violation of Mr. Coulston's
Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Coulston respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's
denial of his suppression motion, vacate his conviction, and remand his case for a new
trial.
DATED this 19 th day of December, 2014.

ER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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